Back to Bilad al-Sham!

 

Lebanon, long entangled in regional rivalries involving Israel, Syria, Iran, and other powers, now faces a renewed challenge from the American ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Ambassador Thomas Barrack. His recent interviews and social media posts — particularly to Arab newspapers such as The National (UAE) and Arab News (Saudi Arabia) — have sparked controversy across Lebanon. Though he later attempted to clarify his views on X, formerly known as Twitter, some of his most provocative statements have already caused considerable backlash.

 

Most notably, Barrack warned that unless Lebanon disarmed Hezbollah, it risked “reverting to being part of Greater Syria again.” This allusion to a return to Bilad al-Sham — a pre-modern regional construct encompassing parts of today’s Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine — struck a raw nerve. For many Lebanese, the idea of reabsorption into Syria is not only unpopular but deeply unsettling. Analysts and citizens alike viewed Barack’s comments as an example of “cynical realism,” more concerned with managing power dynamics than respecting national sovereignty.

 

The fallout was swift. Beyond the “Bilad al-Sham” reference, even more troubling were rumors, reportedly originating from earlier diplomatic discussions, suggesting that Syria might claim Tripoli, Lebanon’s second capital, and parts of the Beqaa Valley in exchange for peace with Israel. Compounding these concerns was an alleged statement attributed to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who reportedly told President Trump: “Lebanon is a burdensome country — let’s hand over the trusteeship to Syria, bring in Ahmad al-Shara’, and integrate it under Syria’s control.” Whether apocryphal or not, such remarks reinforce a dangerous view of Lebanon as a peripheral and expendable state — ripe for foreign manipulation.

 

This perception has deep roots. Many scholars of the Lebanese Civil War point to the 1976 U.S.-backed approval of Syrian intervention, often described as part of a tacit Kissingerian plan to divide Lebanon into spheres of influence between Israel and Syria. These geopolitical designs effectively marginalized Lebanon’s sovereignty in favor of regional stability — defined on others’ terms. Within this context, figures like Ambassador L. Dean Brown have often been misquoted in Lebanese conspiracy narratives, accused of suggesting the mass relocation of Christians to the U.S. or Canada to mitigate sectarian tensions. Yet there is no documentary evidence, such as cables or official statements, to substantiate these claims.

 

History offers a stark warning. A severely asymmetric relationship characterized Lebanon’s prior experience under Syrian tutelage. From 1976 to 2005, Syrian control systematically eroded Lebanese sovereignty, ushering in a regime of corruption, political assassinations, media censorship, and pervasive suppression of dissent. This legacy renders any suggestion of renewed Syrian oversight — no matter how veiled — deeply problematic and broadly rejected.

 

Barrack’s proposal, despite his Lebanese heritage, has been widely criticized for oversimplifying Lebanon’s challenges and underestimating the sensitivity of its political context. Critics argue that he fails to grasp the depth of Lebanon’s struggle against foreign dominance — not just from Syria, but also from Iran, Hezbollah, and other regional actors. Moreover, his comments neglect the complexity of Lebanon’s domestic dynamics, where non-state actors and illicit economies continue to undermine the central government’s authority.

 

Lebanon’s geopolitical marginalization stems from both internal fragmentation and external pressure. Positioned between Syria and Iran, Lebanon has long been vulnerable to regional interference. This has fostered a pervasive narrative of national entrapment — expressed in historical metaphors and political critiques. Yet this discourse often prioritizes diagnosis over prescription, lamenting structural constraints while offering little in the way of strategic agency. A more constructive approach would couple external analysis with internal accountability, portraying Lebanon not only as a victim of history but also as an architect of its future.

 

Reclaiming sovereignty requires bold institutional reform. Above all, Lebanon must establish a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Armed groups such as Hezbollah, which operate independently of the state, fundamentally undermine national sovereignty. As Thomas Hobbes argued in “Leviathan” (1651), without a strong sovereign authority, life becomes “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Lebanon’s fragmented political order — dominated by sectarian leaders, militias, and foreign patrons — illustrates Hobbes’ warning. Sovereignty cannot coexist with competing centers of coercive power.

 

This principle aligns with Max Weber’s classic theory of the state, which defines state legitimacy through the exclusive right to exercise physical force within a given territory. In Lebanon’s case, the coexistence of a formal government and a powerful armed non-state actor like Hezbollah delegitimizes the state itself. The absence of such a monopoly allows for persistent instability and makes Lebanon vulnerable to external manipulation.

 

Realist theories in international relations, particularly those advanced by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, reinforce this perspective. Realism asserts that in an anarchic international system, only strong states survive. Rational actors prioritize security and power; weak states, divided and dependent, become pawns of stronger powers. Lebanon exemplifies this weakness. Lacking strategic independence and internal cohesion, it remains vulnerable to influence from Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.

 

Economic collapse has further eroded Lebanon’s sovereignty. In 2020, the country experienced its first sovereign default and a 90% devaluation of its currency. Banks imposed strict withdrawal limits, and access to U.S. dollars became severely restricted. These conditions have left Lebanon vulnerable to external financial leverage from Gulf states, Iran, and international donors. Efforts to combat illicit financing and militia funding are critical to restoring economic and political autonomy.

 

The Shiite community has borne the brunt of new economic sanctions and blockades, particularly in the post-2024 period. Lebanon’s recovery depends on building an economy less reliant on remittances and foreign aid. Since the 2019 financial collapse, calls for comprehensive reform have intensified, linking economic recovery to national independence and autonomy. The long-term goal is clear: economic resilience is inextricably linked to political sovereignty.

 

In conclusion, the question of Lebanese sovereignty — raised anew by Ambassador Barrack’s statements — cannot be answered by returning to past paradigms like Bilad al-Sham. Instead, it demands a renewed commitment to building a legitimate state, consolidating power under the rule of law, and resisting both foreign tutelage and internal fragmentation. Lebanon’s future, fragile yet not foreclosed, lies in its ability to transform from a geopolitical battleground into a coherent, sovereign state.